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1. Legislative procedure in the European Union: introduction1
The European Union (hereinafter, “EU”) is not made by aliens (but by us 
through our representatives),2 but understanding the Union is not always as easy 
for the common citizen as it would be ideal. Nevertheless, the same could be said 
about Member States legal systems. However, with a significant percentage of  our 
laws coming from the EU and the probable regulation in a harmonised manner of  
key matters for the future,3 understanding how law-making works in the European 
Union is essential. In other words, we need to understand the EU’s legislative 
procedure. The Treaty of  Lisbon changed substantially the law-making procedure 
within the EU and what type of  legislative acts the EU can enact. Nowadays, if  
we are talking strictly about “hard law” as in binding legal acts, the EU can enact 
either Regulations, Directives or Decisions. Decisions are generally directed at a 
specific actor, even though Article 288 TFEU allows for Decisions with a more 
general scope, and they have been used in matters as providing legal foundation for 
programmes. Regulations are meant to completely uniformize the Member States’ 
legal frameworks, they are directly applicable and do not need implementation by 
National Act(s). The degree of  harmonisation pursued by a Directive can greatly 
vary depending on the subject and aims of  the Directive. Maximum harmonisation 
Directives leave few if  any opportunities for “creative” transposition by Member 
States. However, there are aspects that will never be perfectly harmonised/
equal when using Directives, including time of  implementation (within the legal 
limitations, Member States will implement the necessary legal acts at their own 
description and according to their own scheduling).4 Directives are not directly 
applicable – even if  some of  their dispositions can produce direct effect under 
the right circumstances if  the criteria established by the Court of  Justice of  the 
European Union (hereinafter, “CJEU”) are met, namely being clear, unconditional 
and sufficiently precise5 – and depend on Member States to implement them.
There are numerous factors that influence the choice between enacting a 
Directive or a Regulation. Competence is the first, in areas where the EU has 
1 This paper is heavily inspired by our previous work “Democracia, legitimidade e competência legislative 
na União Europeia”, albeit with some relevant developments including the addition of  trilogues 
and a schematic view of  the ordinary legislative procedure. See, Tiago Sérgio Cabral, “Democracia, 
legitimidade e competência legislativa na União Europeia”, in E-book UNIO/CONPEDI Vol. 2: 
Interconstitucionalidade: Democracia e Cidadania de Direitos na Sociedade Mundial - Atualização e Perspectivas, 
Alessandra Silveira coord. (Braga: CEDU, 2018), 265-292. 
2 Alessandra Silveira, “What future do we want for ourselves, for our children and for our Union? (as for 
the 60 years landmark of  the Treaty of  Rome: please open the fridge!)”, UNIO EU Law Journal – The Official 
Blog Thinking and Debating Europe, accessed May 5, 2020, https://officialblogofunio.com/2017/04/03/
editorial-of-april-2017/; Alessandra Silveira, “Cidadania de Direitos e Comunidade Política Europeia 
(sobre a cidadania europeia que se move dos tribunais para a arena política)”, Contencioso da Nacionalidade 
(2nd ed., Lisboa: CEJ, 2017), 38-39. 
3 For example, the General Data Protection Regulation and the Regulation on the free flow of  non-
personal data The Regulation, or the Sale of  Goods and Supply of  Digital Content and Digital 
Services. In the future regulation on AI or DLT will probably be European in nature. 
4 Generally, if  the objective is to fully harmonize Member State law, we find Regulations to be the 
superior solution. They avoid problems such as poor or plain incorrect transposition, different 
transposition schedules, partial transposition, transposition dispersed through various national laws 
and minimise translation issues. They also offer more security to economic operators and citizens 
who just need to consult a specific legal act to know the applicable law, instead of  searching through 
national legislation.  
5 See, Judgment of  the ECJ of  5 April 1979, Ratti, Case C-148/78, ECLI:EU:C:1979:110. 
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exclusive or shared competence, Regulations and Directives are both options at the 
legislator’s disposal, but if  the EU only has the competence to support, coordinate 
or supplement Member-State actions, opting for a Regulation would be in breach 
of  the EU’s constitutional law6 (the flexibility clause contained in Article 352 could 
arguably be used). Political and social climate is the second, both regarding the EU 
and Member States. One can easily see how federalists or “euroenthusiastics” would 
be usually more open to supporting a Regulation than eurosceptics. A higher degree 
of  satisfaction with the EU by its citizens can also allow for more intervention. A 
third factor is the nature of  the Institutions responsible for producing laws in the 
EU. As pure European institutions, both the European Commission (hereinafter, 
“EC”) and the European Parliament (hereinafter, “EP”) are generally more 
ambitious than the Council whose approach is far more cautious. 
Nevertheless, for both Directives and Regulations (and for Decisions that are 
legal acts), there are only three procedures than can be followed: i) the ordinary 
legislative procedure (co-decision); ii) consent procedure and; iii) consultation 
procedure. The rules are illustrated below. 
2. Ordinary Legislative Procedure 
With the changes introduced under the Treaty of  Lisbon, the Co-Decision 
procedure was renamed, or one could argue rebranded to the Ordinary Legislative 
Procedure. The principles and rules underlying it remain the same, but it should 
be now seen as the default legislative procedure and not on equal ground with the 
consent and consultation procedures. Its intended use was also vastly expanded. 
It is in this type of  procedure that the EU’s constitutional design draws closer 
to true bicameralism where both the Council and the EP legislate as true equals. 
The Parliament is the lower chamber and represents the European citizens that 
directly elect Members of  the European Parliament (hereinafter, “MEPs”) while 
the Council is the higher chamber representing Member States’ interests. 
The right of  initiative rests, with minor exceptions,7 with the EC. This 
means that neither the Council nor the EP can directly propose new legislation, 
albeit both may request the EC to do so.8 In fact, the Framework Agreement on 
relations between the European Parliament and the EC (hereinafter, “Framework 
Agreement”) goes considerably further than the letter of  the Treaties burdening 
the EC with the duty to “to report on the concrete follow-up of  any request to submit a 
proposal pursuant to Article 225 TFEU (legislative initiative report) within 3 months following 
adoption of  the corresponding resolution in plenary. The Commission shall come forward with 
a legislative proposal at the latest after 1 year or shall include the proposal in its next year’s 
Work Programme. If  the Commission does not submit a proposal, it shall give Parliament 
detailed explanations of  the reasons”.9 Some developments may soon be happening 
6 In fact, this would also be the case for a Directive that intended to establish a maximum harmonization 
regimen. 
7 As an example, Article 76 TFUE permits exceptional initiative by a ¼ of  the Member States, for 
Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters, Police Cooperation and for the creation of  administrative 
measures to ensure cooperation within the Area of  Freedom, Security and Justice.
8 For the European Parliament this right is contained in Article 225 TFEU and for the Council in 
Article 241 TFEU. 
9 Regarding the Council, Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca argue that this power is used with such 
frequency that in practice, it works almost like a pseudo-right of  initiative. See, Paul Craig and Gráinne 
de Búrca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (6.ª ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 125.
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on this front. In her opening statement in the European Parliament Plenary 
Session, the new President of  the EC, Ursula von der Leyen promised that, if  
elected,10 she would support a right of  initiative for the European Parliament. 
It is still not clear how said support would materialise. It may be through trying 
to push an amendment to the Constitutional Treaties, even though that seems 
unlikely, or through a new Interinstitutional Agreement adopted under Article 
295 TFEU. For now, the President-elect of  the EC only specified that when 
Parliament adopts Resolutions requesting the Commission to submit a legislative 
proposal, her Commission pledges to respond with a “legislative act in full respect 
of  the proportionality, subsidiarity, and better law-making principles”. It is also unclear 
whether the said legislative Resolution would contain a proposal for the content 
and text of  the legislative act, that the EC would just “copy and paste” or if  it just 
a request and content will still be defined by the EC. The first solution would be 
more akin to a true (albeit indirect) right to initiate legislation, the second would 
be similar to what is currently in the Framework Agreement. In this last scenario, 
the difference could be that the Commission would renounce the “right” to not 
submit a proposal.11
The content of  the EC’s proposal has binding power over other actors in 
the legislative procedure. Amendments cannot completely change the nature of  
the proposal because that would be akin to undermining the power given to this 
Institution.12 The position of  the EC is further strengthened by the fact that any 
amendment on which the EC has delivered a negative opinion has to be approved 
with unanimity in the Council. The EC can also alter its proposal at any time, as 
long as the Council has not yet acted.
The procedure’s first reading is kickstarted by the submission of  the EC’s 
proposal to both the European Parliament and the Council. The Parliament is the 
first one to give its opinion and can choose three options: fully agree with it, amend 
it and send to the Council or reject it. If  the European Parliament decides to reject 
the proposal at this stage the procedure ends, and the Act is not adopted. 
If  the Parliament agrees or amends the proposal it moves on to the Council. 
The Council can vote by qualified majority to adopt the proposal in the 
wording which corresponds to the position of  the European Parliament13 or can 
adopt is own position on the proposed Act and then send it back to the Parliament. 
10 The speech was delivered before the confirmation vote which von der Leyen won with a (thin) 
majority of  383 MEPs. The support of  several MEPs from groups like S&D and Renew Europe 
was made conditional on including in her programme a number of  proposals, including the one 
abovementioned.  
11 See, “Opening Statement in the European Parliament Plenary Session by Ursula von der Leyen, 
Candidate for President of  the European Commission”, European Commission, accessed July 
17, 2019, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-19-4230_en.htm; Tiago Sérgio Cabral, 
“Legislative Initiative for the European Parliament: A Wish for 2020”, UNIO EU Law Journal – 
The Official Blog Thinking and Debating Europe, accessed 1 May, 2020, https://officialblogofunio.
com/2020/01/07/editorial-of-january-2020/. 
12 Cfr. According to the Advocate General Tesauro “the amendments adopted [cannot[ fall outside the scope 
of  the measure in question, as defined by the proposal”. See, Judgment of  the ECJ of  11 November 1997, 
Eurotunnel SA v. SeaFrance, Case C-408/95, ECLI:EU:C:1997:532, 35-39.; Opinion of  the Advocate 
General delivered on 27 May 1997, Eurotunnel SA v. SeaFrance, Case C-408/95, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2470; 
Judgment of  the ECJ of  14 April 2015, Council v Commission, Case C-409/13, ECLI:EU:C:2015:217. 
13 If  no amendments are made to the proposal by the European Parliament, it can directly reflect the 
wording proposed by the European Commission. 
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If  the co-legislators are not able to agree on a position in the first reading, 
the procedure enters its second reading. The proposal goes back to the European 
Parliament where it can be approved by a majority of  the votes cast or by tacit 
agreement (absence of  a decision within a three-month time limit, extendable by 
one month). The proposal can also be rejected or amended by a majority “of  
its component members”. Rejection by Parliament means the end of  the line for the 
proposal. However, Parliamentary amendments mean that the proposed Act must 
go back to the Council where, by qualified majority, the Institution must choose 
one of  the following: either i) accept all amendments or ii) reject all amendments. 
There is no more room for back-and-forth modifications between co-legislators. 
If  the Council fails to accept the Parliament’s demands, a Conciliation Committee 
is created. 
Conciliation aims at bringing the legislative procedure to a successful 
conclusion through closer cooperation between Parliament and Council, fostered 
by the Commission.14 The Committee is composed of  an equal number of  
representatives from the Council15 and from the European Parliament, whose duty 
is to reach a joint proposal [Article 294(10) TFEU]. The Committee must reach this 
joint proposal within a 6-week timeframe, otherwise the proposal is not adopted. 
If  the Conciliation Committee reaches a joint proposal, the third, and last, 
reading begins. Both Council and Parliament have a 6-week deadline to approve 
the joint agreement. Parliament acts by majority of  the votes cast and the Council 
acts by qualified majority. This is the final opportunity for the co-legislators to 
adopt the Act. If  it is not approved, the legislative procedure ends here.16  
14 One must not that trilogues can also take place before and during Conciliation to increase the 
likelihood of  a fruitful conclusion. 
15 Representatives from the Council can be either members of  the Council or their representatives.
16 See, Miguel Gorjão-Henríques, “Anotação ao art. 289.º do TFUE”, in Tratado de Lisboa anotado e 
comentado, coord. Manuel Lopes Porto and Gonçalo Anastácio (Coimbra: Almedina, 2012), 1034-
1038; Inês Morgado, “Anotação ao art. 293.º do TFUE”, in Tratado de Lisboa, 1048-1049; César 
Cortes e Paulo Rangel, “Anotação ao art. 294.º do TFUE”, in Tratado de Lisboa, 1050-1059; Robert 
Schiitze, European constitutional law, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 169ff.; João 
Mota de Campos, João Luís Mota de Campos and António Pinto Ferreira, Manual de direito europeu: 
o sistema institucional. A ordem jurídica e o ordenamento económico da União Europeia (7th ed., Coimbra: 
Coimbra Editora, 2014), 214; Alina Kaczorowska, European Union Law, (3.ª ed., London: Routledge, 
2013); 148; Directorate-General for Internal Policies of  the Union and Directorate for Legislative 
Coordination and Conciliations Conciliations and Codecision Unit, Handbook on the Ordinary 
Legislative Procedure (European Parliament: Brussels, 2017), 11-25 and 37-39; Pierre Mathijsen and 
Peter Dyrberg, Mathijsen’s Guide to European Union Law (11th ed., London: Sweet & Maxwell Ltd, 
2013), 88; Vincenzo Guizzi, Manuale di diritto e politica dell’ Unione Europea (4th ed., Naples: Editoriale 
Scientifica: 2015), 366; Miguel Gorjão-Henriques, Direito da União: História, Direito, Cidadania, 
Mercado Interno e Concorrênncia (9th ed., Coimbra: Almedina, 2019), 249. 
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Ordinary Legislative Procedure: Diagram
2.1. Trilogues 
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Currently, 97% of  all Ordinary Legislative Procedure files are adopted either at 
first or early second reading, with the percentage of  full second readings standing 
at a mere 3% and third readings having practically disappeared. The reason for 
this phenomenon is the growing trend of  trilogues. Trilogues are informal (but 
institutionalised) “negotiations between representatives of  Parliament and Council, assisted by the 
Commission, aimed at reaching agreement on legislation, normally at an early stage of  the legislative 
process”.17/18
Typically, a variable number of  trilogue meetings is held between representatives 
of  the three law-making institutions, about 3.5 being the average.19 Generally, trilogues 
occur in the Parliament’s Brussels building. Technical trilogues like preparatory or 
operational meetings can be used to clear the path for the main political trilogues. 
In the trilogue meetings, “Parliament is represented the Committee Chair leading the 
delegation, sometimes replaced by a Vice-President, the Rapporteur and Shadow Rapporteurs from 
the different parties, their assistants, political party functionaries and Committee secretariat staff. The 
Council is represented at earlier stages by the civil servant who chaired the Council Working Party 
supported by the Council Secretariat, and at later stages by the Chair of  the Committee of  Permanent 
Representatives. Finally, the Commission sends Heads of  Unit or Directors, supported by the Legal 
Service and the Co-Decision Unit, although sometimes Director-Generals or their Deputies attend 
from the outset. A Commissioner often attends the concluding trilogues”.20
Negotiations are based on a multi-column document where each of  the first 
three columns contains the positions of  the Commission, Parliament and Council. 
The fourth column is initially blank and is filled during negotiation with the jointly 
agreed position.  
The three institutions hail trilogues as highly useful tools that contribute to 
expedient law-making. And while it is undeniable that they are effective, we cannot 
ignore the fact that authors have been, for a number of  years, pointing to the fact that 
that when compared to the constitutionally enshrined readings procedure, trilogues 
lack in transparency. 
Trilogues are closed-door affairs attended by a few representatives of  the three 
Institutions.21 Documents related to trilogues are not freely available to citizens and, 
in fact, the Institutions usually fight tooth and nail against attempts to access them. 
They argue that making the discussions public causes disturbances in the legislative 
17 See, “Decision of  the European Ombudsman setting out proposals following her strategic inquiry 
OI/8/2015/JAS concerning the transparency of  Trilogues”, European Ombudsman, access 
January, 20, 2019, https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/decision/en/69206; Gijs Jan Brandsma, 
“Transparency of  EU informal trilogues through public feedback in the European Parliament: 
promise unfulfilled”, Journal of  European Public Policy (2018): 1-20. 
18 Currently 70% to 80% of  EU legislation is adopted following trilogues. See, Judgment of  the EGC 
of  22 March 2018, De Capitani v Parliament, Case T-540/15, ECLI:EU:T:2018:167, 70. 
19 More complex legislation might take significantly more trilogues to be agreed. The General Data 
Protection Regulation, for example, took 14 trilogues before the law-making institutions could reach 
an agreement. 
20 See, Justin Greenwood and Christilla Roederer-Rynning, “Taming Trilogues: The EU’s Law-Making 
Process in a Comparative Perspective”, in The European Parliament in times of  EU crisis: Dynamics and 
Transformations, Olivier Costa ed. (Maastricht: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 121-141; Deirdre Curtin and 
Päivi Leino, “In Search of  Transparency for EU Law-Making: Trialogues on the Cusp of  Dawn”, 
Common Market Law Review vol. 54, No. 6 (2017): 1673–1712. 
21 A frequent criticism to trilogues is that this type of  procedure puts too much power in a few 
representatives/officials. However, empirical analysis seems to contradict these conclusions. See, Anne 
Rasmussen & Christine Ren, “The consequences of  concluding codecision early: trilogues and intra-
institutional bargaining success”, Journal of  European Public Policy vol. 20, No. 7 (2013): 1006-1024. 
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procedure and does allow for the legislators to freely express their opinion.22 We deem 
such a position – particularly in an era where transparency is highly recognised in the 
European Union making-process – as appearing unacceptable for both co-legislators, 
but especially for the EP. 
Council meetings are relatively informal, ministers even address each other on 
a first-name basis. This ensures that, away from the public eye, they can negotiate 
freely and compromise without fearing backlash in their Member States, but one would 
argue at the cost of  some transparency. The Council prefers to see its reunions as 
diplomatic summits instead of  what they really are: legislative meetings from a Senate-
like Chamber of  a law-making body. Council documents regarding legislative files are 
usually only made available to the public after the procedure is over. Moreover, some 
documents like Legal Service opinions are generally not disclosed, in this case as to 
not restrict the freedom of  the legal counsel. Member States can also request that 
documents reflecting their position during negotiations are not made available to the 
public. 
We should not forget that when legislating accountability is key, citizens should 
be able to analyse and, if  they disapprove of  the way that the minister is conducting 
business in the Council, express their disapproval internally (through voting). However, 
truth be told, the Council is not designed to be and has never tried to assert itself  as 
the Institution that, more closely, represents the will of  the European citizens. That is 
the role of  the EP.23 
Indeed, MEPs are elected to the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage 
[Article 14(3) TEU] and have the most direct democratic legitimacy of  any of  the 
Institutions.24 Parliament takes this to heart, and most legislative affairs there happen 
in a fairly transparent manner. Both plenary and committee meetings are broadcast 
live and made available with interpretation to allow citizens from different countries 
to understand them. Getting accreditation to access the European Parliament is a 
22 See, Directorate-General for Internal Policies of  the Union and Directorate for Legislative 
Coordination and Conciliations Conciliations and Codecision Unit, Handbook, 26-36.; Christilla 
Roederer‑Rynning, “Passage to bicameralism: Lisbon’s ordinary legislative procedure at ten”, 
Comparative European Politics (2018): 1-17; Directorate-General for Internal Policies of  the Union 
and Directorate for Legislative Coordination and Conciliations Conciliations and Codecision Unit, 
Activity Report on the Ordinary Legislative Procedure: 4 July 2014 - 31 December 2016 (8th parliamentary term) 
(European Parliament, Brussels: 2017), 19.; Christilla Roederer-Rynning and Justin Greenwood, “The 
culture of  trilogues”, Journal of  European Public Policy vol. 22, No. 8 (2015): 1148–1165; Christilla 
Roederer-Rynning and Justin Greenwood, “The European Parliament as a developing legislature: 
coming of  age in trilogues?”, Journal of  European Public Policy vol. 24, No. 5 (2017): 735-754; Aidan 
O’Sullivan, “How transparency can be improved in the way EU laws are negotiated and agreed”, LSE 
Blog, access January 30, 2019, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2016/08/18/how-transparency-
can-be-improved-in-the-way-eu-laws-are-negotiated-and-agreed/.
23 Nonetheless and even though the root of  the Council’s legitimacy is different from the EP’s (i.e. 
Council possesses intergovernmental legitimacy while the EP possesses direct democratic legitimacy) 
that should not be considered a reason to not hold it to the same degree of  scrutiny as the EP. 
As expressed above, citizens still hold the right to hold their representatives accountable (even if  
internally) and the Council’s decisions need to be transparent for that to be possible. Furthermore, 
one would argue (as we did above) that the legislative procedure in the EU is much closer to a standard 
bicameral law-making procedure than to a diplomatic summit. In this context, intergovernmental 
legitimacy may prove inadequate. See, Maria Luísa Duarte, União Europeia: Estatíca e Dinâmica da Ordem 
Jurdíca Eurocomunitária (Coimbra: Almedina, 2011), 122.
24 See, Tiago Sérgio Cabral and Rita de Sousa Costa, “The European Union’s existential crisis: current 
challenges from populism to Donald Trump”, UNIO - EU Law Journal, vol. 4, No. 1 (2018): 3-15.
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relatively straightforward procedure. Furthermore, lobbying is regulated and done with 
increasing transparency.25 With all this in mind, are there any efforts by the European 
Parliament to boost transparency in trilogues? The short, answer is that yes there 
are, but they do not seem to be enough. In a 2014 Resolution on public access to 
documents, the European Parliament argued for broad changes to trilogues by calling; 
“on the Commission, the Council and Parliament to ensure the greater transparency of  informal 
trilogues, by holding the meetings in public, publishing documentation including calendars, agendas, 
minutes, documents examined, amendments, decisions taken, information on Member State delegations 
and their positions and minutes, in a standardised and easily accessible online environment”.26 More 
recent Resolutions have restated Parliament’s position on the issue, even though the 
demand for public meetings has apparently disappeared.27
The other Institutions have shown little receptivity to these proposals and, in 
fact, even Parliament did little of  substance to achieve its aims. Currently, Article 69(f) 
of  the EP’s Rules of  Procedure enshrines rules about the mandatory composition of  
negotiation teams to avoid any excessive concentration of  power in a reduced number 
of  actors [Article 69(f), first paragraph]. There are also rules on “reporting back” the 
progress achieved during trilogues [Article 69(f), third paragraph]. The underlying 
reasoning behind reporting back rules is that if  the negotiators report to the responsible 
committees and since said committees are broadcast to the public, citizens can also get 
the relevant information. In practice, the rule does not apply if  it is not “feasible” to do 
so, and studies show that it plainly does not work.28
The problem is considered severe enough to merit the European Ombudsman’s 
attention. In her Decision setting out proposals following her strategic inquiry 
OI/8/2015/JAS concerning the transparency of  trilogues, the Ombudsman states the 
current structure of  trilogues might breach the principles of  representative democracy 
(Article 10 TUE) and the right of  European citizens to participate in the democratic 
life of  the Union. The issue is, above all else, one of  accountability. If  citizens and 
National Parliaments do not know how their representatives cast their votes, how 
they are making their arguments for the causes they represent when they are making 
concessions, and when they are standing their ground, they cannot properly assess 
their performance and penalize or reward them accordingly. Furthermore, it is close to 
impossible for citizens and stakeholders to participate in the decision-making process 
if  they do not know when the meetings are being held, who is there, what is being 
25 In January 2019, the European Parliament approved an amendment to Rules of  Procedure that 
orders “rapporteurs, shadow rapporteurs and committee chairs shall, for each report, [to] publish online all scheduled 
meetings with interest representatives falling under the scope of  the Transparency register”. Negotiations between 
the Institutions are underway to revamp and expand the Transparency Register.   
26 See, “European Parliament resolution of  11 March 2014 on public access to documents (Rule 104(7)) 
for the years 2011-2013”, European Parliament, access January 20, 2019, https://www.europarl.europa.
eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2014-0203+0+DOC+XML+V0//
EN&language=EN. 
27 See, “European Parliament resolution of  14 September 2017 on transparency, accountability and 
integrity in the EU institutions”, European Parliament, access January 23, 2019, https://www.europarl.
europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P8-TA-2017-0358;“European 
Parliament resolution of  28 April 2016 on public access to documents (Rule 116(7)) for the years 
2014-2015”, European Parliament, access January 23, 2019, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/
getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P8-TA-2016-0202&language=EN#def_1_10. 
28 Furthermore, the voting rules in Article 69 take negotiating power away from the Parliament by not 
allowing amendments to the provisional agreement. See, Justin Greenwood and Christilla Roederer-
Rynning, “Taming Trilogues: The EU’s Law-Making Process”, 127-130. 
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discussed and what is the current stage of  the discussions. Lobbying is an integral part 
of  the European Union, one might even say a cornerstone, but lobbying should not 
be understood as practice that is only achievable by a select few insiders. Every citizen 
should be able to lobby their representatives in a transparent manner. 
However, it is a fact that public pressure and continuous vigilance over the 
representatives’ behaviour might be counterproductive, especially in the middle of  the 
negotiation procedure. A representative might lose the ability to think strategically and 
to give ground on some issues expecting to gain concessions further down the line 
because public opinion reacts immediately, and public outrage spreads like wildfire. 
After weighing all these considerations, the Ombudsman made the following 
proposals: 
1. That the institutions make publicly available a “trilogue calendar” identifying forthcoming 
trilogues. They should also refer to trilogues in databases on legislative files;
2. That both co-legislators make proactively available, before trilogue negotiations begin, their 
positions on the Commission proposal, regardless of  the level at which the position has been 
adopted internally and regardless of  the legislative proposal;
3. That the Institutions make available general summary agendas before or shortly after trilogue 
meetings; 
4. That the institutions make proactively available four-column documents, including the final 
agreed text, as soon as possible after the negotiations have been concluded;
5. That the institutions include, in legislative databases and calendars dealing with trilogues, 
links to any minutes or videos of  the institutions’ public meetings where a trilogue has been 
discussed;
6. That the institutions make proactively available a list of  the representatives who are politically 
responsible for decisions taken during a trilogue, such as the MEPs involved, the responsible 
Minister from the Council Presidency and the Commissioner in charge of  the file. If  the power 
to take decisions is delegated to civil servants, their identities should also be disclosed proactively;
7. For the purposes of  facilitating requests for public access to documents, the institutions make 
available as far as possible lists of  documents tabled during trilogue negotiations;
8. Furthermore, the Ombudsman encourages the institutions to work together to make as much 
trilogue information and documentation as possible publicly available through an easy-to-use and 
easy-to-understand joint database.29
The Ombudsman’s proposals are, in our opinion, generally balanced and easy to 
apply. If  anything, one could argue that they should go further on issues like access to 
the multi-column documents. In this matter, the Ombudsman seems to accept a type 
of  presumption of  secrecy for the document until its content can no longer have an 
impact on negotiations, going opposite to the CJEU and General Court’s case-law on 
this matter.30 The general rule should be for open access to documents related to the 
legislative procedure, with exceptions only tolerable when disclosure of  the document 
would seriously undermine the Institution’s decision-making process. Such an issue 
should be decided on a case-by-case basis. We can accept that general presumptions 
of  confidentiality have been recognized by the CJEU for some types of  documents, 
29 “Decision of  the European Ombudsman setting out proposals following her strategic inquiry 
OI/8/2015/JAS concerning the transparency of  Trilogues”, European Ombudsman, accessed 
January 20, 2019, https://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/decision/en/69206.
30 Fact is that the European Court of  Justice’s interpretation of  what can seriously undermine the 
decision-making is extremely strict as seen in Access Info Europe. See, Judgment of  the ECJ of  17 
October 2013, Access Info Europe v. Council, Case C‑280/11 P, ECLI:EU:C:2013:671, upholding the 
Judgment of  the EGC of  22 March 2011, Case T-233/09, ECLI:EU:T:2011:105. 
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namely: “the documents in an administrative file relating to a procedure for reviewing State aid; 
the submissions lodged in proceedings before the courts of  the European Union, for as long as those 
proceedings remain pending; the documents exchanged between the Commission and notifying parties 
or third parties in the course of  merger control proceedings; the documents relating to an infringement 
procedure during its pre-litigation stage, including the documents exchanged between the Commission 
and the Member State concerned during an EU Pilot procedure; and the documents relating to a 
proceeding under Article 101 TFEU”.31 However, there was no reason to think that these 
general presumptions of  confidentiality also applied to every multi-column document. 
In fact, after De Capitani, it seems clear that multi-column documents are, indeed, not 
protected by this exception and should be disclosed as widely as possible, as a general 
principle. Full refusal should be a last resort, even when the requirements under Article 
4 of  Regulation 1049/2001/EC are met, solutions like confidentially obligations to 
be imposed on the interested parties should be studied before opting for a negative 
answer.   
In De Capitani,32 the General Court of  the European Union analysed the refusal by 
the European Parliament to provide access to the fourth column of  two multi-column 
documents part of  trilogue negotiations on Police Cooperation, “including issues of  data 
protection and the management board of” Europol. The European Parliament sustained its 
refusal on Article 4(3) of  Regulation 1049/2001/EC of  the European Parliament 
and of  the Council of  30 May 2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, 
Council and EC documents, arguing that making these documents available would 
impair the Institutions’ ability to decide, harm the confidence between the Institutions 
and Member States, hinder cooperation with the Council and open to door to external 
pressures on the ongoing negotiation. 
We note that, with more than a touch of  incoherence, Parliament appears in 
contradiction with its previous Resolutions. Even though the Resolutions accept the 
existence of  exceptions to the principle of  wide access by citizens to the legislative 
procedure, their spirit is that exceptions are precisely that: exceptions. Such a broad 
interpretation of  the exceptions under Regulation 1049/2001/EC clearly goes against 
their spirit (and also of  the 2016 Interinstitutional Agreement). 
With all this in mind, the Court’s ruling can only be seen as a victory to transparency 
and a reason for the Institutions to rethink their position on the issue. First, the Court 
states that the exceptions in Article 4 of  Regulation 1049/2001/EC must be interpreted 
and applied strictly.33 Furthermore, the fact that a matter is covered by one of  the 
exceptions is not enough to warrant refusal as a casuistic analysis of  the particular case 
must be conducted. Only if  the danger is likely to manifest itself  and that likelihood of  
manifestation is reasonably foreseeable can the exception be called upon. 
The Court also clarified in definitive that trilogues are part of  the legislative 
procedure and thus, are subject to all general principles that govern it, including 
31 See, Judgment of  the ECJ of  4 September 2018, ClientEarth v Commission, Case C-57/16 P, 
ECLI:EU:C:2018:660 and also the decision that it repealed, Judgment of  the EGC of  13 November 
2015, ClientEarth v Commission, Case T-424/14, ECLI:EU:T:2015:848. 
32 See, Judgment of  the EGC of  22 March 2018, De Capitani v Parliament, Case T-540/15, 
ECLI:EU:T:2018:167.
33 In its Judgment in Turco the European Court of  Justice shows how strict its interpretation is. Even 
if  a document is covered by one of  the exceptions of  Regulation nº 1049/2001/EC, in this case 
regarding legal opinions, a comprehensive assessment must be undertaken to decide which parts, in 
particular, cannot be disclosed. See, Judgment of  the ECJ of  1 July 2008, Turco v. Council, Joined Cases 
C‑39/05 P and C‑52/05 P, ECLI:EU:C:2008:374. 
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openness and transparency. Furthermore, the Court found that there is no general 
presumption of  non-disclosure regarding the fourth column of  the multi-column 
document. 
Regarding accountability and the right to participate in the democratic life of  
the Union, the Court argued that the European citizens are perfectly capable of  
understanding the nature of  trilogues and the fact that the positions expressed in 
the fourth column can change during negotiation or even end with no deal at all. 
The paternalistic vision of  the Institutions seems to have been rejected. Additionally, 
the General Court delivered a much-needed reminder that cooperation between the 
Institutions is not a choice at their discretion but a constitutional obligation. 
Following this reasoning, the Court decided to annul the decision refusing access 
to the multi-column document. The Committee on Legal Affairs of  the European 
Parliament decided to accept the decision instead of  submitting an appeal to the CJEU. 
However, efforts to reinforce transparency in its wake have, thus far, been meek.34/35
3. Special Legislative Procedures 
3.1. Consent Procedure 
Following the general rule, in the consent procedure, the right to propose legislation 
lies with the EC.36 Still, unlike the Ordinary Legislative Procedure, within the limits of  
the CJEU’s case-law (namely, amendments cannot completely change the nature of  the 
proposal, as stated above) the Council possesses full decision power on the legal Act’s 
content. In this type of  procedure, the EP maintains vetoing power but no more. It can 
either “agree” with the act in its entirety or stop it completely. In practice, this “take it 
or leave it” approach is softened by the EP’s power to issue an interim report during 
the procedure and by informal discussions between the Institutions. The EP may use 
these tools to suggest the necessary amendments to win parliamentary approval.37 The 
consent procedure is used in situations such as:
	Article 7(1) TEU, according to which on a reasoned proposal by a third of  
the Member States, acting through the European Parliament or the European 
Commission, the Council, acting by a majority of  four-fifths of  its members after 
obtaining the consent of  the European Parliament, may determine that there is 
a clear risk of  a serious breach by a Member State of  the values referred to in 
Article 2 TEU.
34 See, Francesca Martines, “Transparency of  Legislative Procedures and Access to Acts of  Trilogues: 
Case T-540/15, De Capitani v. European Parliament”, European Papers, vol. 3, No. 2 (2018): 947-959; 
Massimo Frigo , “EU Court Condemns the EU Legislative Process for Lack of  Transparency: Time to 
Open Up?” Opinio Juris Blog, accessed December 10, 2018, http://opiniojuris.org/2018/03/27/33507/. 
35 “Interinstitutional Agreement between the European Parliament, the Council of  the European 
Union and the European Commission on Better Law-Making”, EC, EP and Council, accessed 
December 10, 2018, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32016
Q0512(01)&from=EN.
36 An exception can be identified in Article 86(1) TFEU (regarding the implementation of  the 
European Public Prosecutor’s Office) read along with Article 76 TFEU. 
37 Alina Kaczorowska, European, 158 e ss; Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca, EU Law, 130 e ss; Robert 
Schiitze, European Constitutional, 176 e ss; Steve Peers, Guide to EU decision-making and justice and home affairs 
after the Treaty of  Lisbon (London: Statewatch, 2010), http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-115-lisbon-
treaty-decision-making.pdf; “The Special Legislative Procedures: Consent”, University of  Portsmouth 
European Studies Hub, accessed December 13, 2019, http://hum.port.ac.uk/europeanstudieshub/
learning/module-2-understanding-eu-policy-making/the-special-legislative-procedures/. 
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	Article 7(2) TEU, which establishes that the European Council, acting by 
unanimity on a proposal by one third of  the Member States or by the Commission 
and after obtaining the consent of  the European Parliament, may determine the 
existence of  a serious and persistent breach by a Member State of  the values 
referred to in Article 2 TEU, after inviting the Member State in question to submit 
its observations.38
	Article 49 TUE, regarding application and accession to the Union states that 
the Council shall act unanimously after consulting the Commission and after 
receiving the consent of  the European Parliament, which shall act by a majority 
of  its component members and respecting the conditions of  eligibility agreed 
upon by the European Council.39
	Article 50 TEU, regarding the agreement setting out the arrangements for the 
withdrawal of  a Member State from the Union. The abovementioned agreement 
shall be concluded on behalf  of  the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified 
majority, after obtaining the consent of  the European Parliament.40
	Article 25 TFEU, regarding the reinforcement or addition of  rights to the 
European citizen. In this situation, the Council acting unanimously in accordance 
with a special legislative procedure and after obtaining the consent of  the 
European Parliament may adopt provisions with this aim. Said provisions will 
only enter into force after approval by Member States.41
	Article 218(6) TFEU, when the Council adopts a decision concluding the 
following agreements, it must obtain the consent of  the EP: i) association 
agreements; ii) agreement on Union accession to the European Convention 
for the Protection of  Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR); 
iii) agreements establishing a specific institutional framework by organising 
cooperation procedures; iv) agreements with important budgetary implications 
for the Union; v) agreements covering fields to which either the Ordinary 
Legislative Procedure applies, or the special legislative procedure where consent 
by the European Parliament is required.42
	Article 223(1) TFEU, covering the election rules for the European Parliament.43 
	Article 311 (4th paragraph) TFEU, according to which the Council, acting by 
means of  Regulations in accordance with a special legislative procedure, shall lay 
38 See, Stelio Mangiameli and Katharina Pabel, “Article 7 [The Principles of  the Federal Coercion]”, in 
The Treaty on European Union (TEU): a Commentary, Hermann-Josef  Blanke and Stelio Mangiameli eds., 
(Heidelberg: Springer, 2013), 349-373; Luís Miguel País Antunes, “Anotação ao artigo 7.º do TUE”, 
in Tratado de Lisboa, 43-46.
39 See, Susanna Fortunato, “Article 49 [Accession to the Union]”, in The Treaty on European Union 
(TEU), 1357-1383; Ricardo Bayão Horta, “Anotação ao artigo 49.º do TUE”, in Tratado de Lisboa, 
183-185. 
40 See, note 146. 
41 See, Rui Manuel Moura Ramos, “Anotação aos art.os 18.º a 23.º do TFUE”, in Tratado de Lisboa, 258-
263; Rui Manuel Moura Ramos, “Anotação ao artigo 25.º do TFUE”, in Tratado de Lisboa, 268. 
42 See, Margarida Afonso, “Anotação ao artigo 218.º do TFUE”, in Tratado de Lisboa, 832-837.
43 See, Vital Moreira, “Anotação ao artigo 223.º do TFUE”, in Tratado de Lisboa, 847-850. While we 
concede that this procedure possesses very specific characteristics such as the such as the fact that 
the EP must draw up an initial proposal, this is not enough to make one perish to thought that this 
provision is in need of  serious revamp. At the very least, the ordinary legislative procedure should 
have been adopted in this situation. It is unacceptable and, in fact, borderline embarrassing for the 
entirety of  European democracy that the European Parliament has less power to decide the rules of  
its own election than the Council. 
® UNIO - EU LAW JOURNAL Vol. 6, No. 1,  January 2020
174 Tiago Sérgio Cabral
down implementing measures for the Union’s own resources system in so far as 
this is provided for in the decision adopted on the basis of  the third paragraph. 
The Council shall act after obtaining the consent of  the European Parliament.44
	Article 352 TFUE (flexibility clause).45
Infrequently, there are some residual cases where the European Parliament acts 
as the commanding institution. This coincides with the (very few) situations 
where the EP has legislative initiative and generally relate to matters of  internal 
organisation. Some examples are Article 223(2) TFEU, Article 226 TFEU46 and 
Article 228(4) TFEU.
3.2. Consultation Procedure 
In the consultation procedure, the Council appears in an even stronger position 
(in comparison with the consent procedure). Again, the right of  initiative rests with 
the Commission and this Institution refers the proposal to the Council (constitutional 
limitations to the degree of  changes that can be made to the initial proposal still apply).47 
In this procedure, the Council is bound to request the opinion of  the EP regarding 
the Act, but no more than that. The EP has no veto power in this procedure and the 
substantive content of  its opinion holds no more than a persuasive nature over the 
Council. If  the Council wishes to do so, it may ignore it its entirety and decide in an 
entirely different manner. Doing so does not affect the validity of  the Act. 
Nevertheless, Parliamentary opinion must be heard (even if  not heeded) and the 
Council cannot suppress or ignore this step. It is an essential formality in accordance 
with the CJEU’s judgment in SA Roquette Frères v. Council. In this judgment, the Court 
declared Regulation 1293/79/CEE to be void due to not having complied with this 
requirement. According to the CJEU: “the consultation provided for in the third subparagraph 
of  Article 43(2), as in other similar provisions of  the Treaty, is the means which allows the Parliament 
to play an actual part in the legislative process of  the Community. Such power represents an essential 
factor in the institutional balance intended by the Treaty. Although limited, it reflects at Community 
level the fundamental democratic principle that the peoples should take part in the exercise of  power 
through the intermediary of  a representative assembly. Due consultation of  the Parliament in the cases 
provided for by the Treaty therefore constitutes an essential formality disregard of  which means that 
the measure concerned is void”.48 This parliamentary power is not without limits though. 
According to the CJEU in Parliament v. Council, inter-institutional dialogue is subject “to 
the same mutual duties of  sincere cooperation as those which govern relations between Member States 
and the Community institutions”. Thus “Parliament is not entitled to complain of  the Council’s 
failure to await its opinion before adopting” an Act when failure to comply with the “essential 
procedural requirement of  Parliamentary consultation” resulted from “Parliament’s failure to 
discharge its obligation to cooperate sincerely with the Council”.49
44 See, Manuel Lopes Porto, “Anotação ao artigo 311.º do TFUE”, in Tratado de Lisboa, 1099-1102.
45 See, Ana Maria Guerra Martins, “Anotação ao artigo 352.º do TFUE”, in Tratado de Lisboa, 1232-1235.
46 Regarding the rules enshrined in Article 226 TFEU, the appropriateness of  the EP having to request 
consent from the EC and Council to define rules governing the right of  enquiry in the EP is debatable. 
47 In line with what we explained regarding the consent procedures, there are also some exceptions 
in the consultation procedures such as Articles 87(3) and 89 TFEU, read in connexion with Article 
76 TFEU.
48 See, Judgment of  the ECJ of  29 October 1980, SA Roquette Frères v. Conselho, Case 138/79, 
ECLI:EU:C:1980:249, 33-36.
49 See, Judgment of  the ECJ of  16 July 1992, Parliament v. Council, Case C-65/93 ECLI:EU:C:1992:325, 
23-27.  
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Nonetheless, one may argue that the – admittedly very limited, especially if  we 
take into account the limitations derived from the CJEU’s case-law – power to slow 
down an Act’s adoption may grand some influence to EP in a legislative procedure 
where it is wholly outranked and outgunned by the Council. By withholding 
its opinion, it is (at least theoretically) possible for Parliament to hold informal 
negotiations that may be particularly effective when the proposal is urgent in nature 
when the EP’s position finds wide support within the ranks of  its MEPs, when the 
EP’s position is in line with the Commission’s and when the Act requires unanimity 
to be approved in the Council. If  the proposed Act is part of  a legislative package 
containing measures that follow other types of  legislative procedure (consultation 
and especially the ordinary legislative procedure), Parliament may make its approval 
on other acts in the package depended on amendments to the Act(s) adopted under 
the consultation procedure.50/51
50 Raya Kardasheva, “The Power to Delay: The European Parliament’s Influence in the Consultation 
Procedure”, Journal of  Common Market Studies, vol. 47, No. 2 (March 2009): 385-409.
51 The power to delay is frequently used in other Constitutional Systems as a negotiation tool. In the 
United States of  America, under the right circumstances Filibusters may might allow a majority to delay, 
negotiate on even stop the adoption of  undesirable measures. “Shutdowns” may also be considered as a 
means to use time as a factor of  pressure in negotiations. The talking filibuster is the most well-known, 
but not the only type of  filibuster, in the talking filibuster a member of  the law-making body speaks 
continuously for long hours, delaying the debate regarding a certain proposal and hindering its adoption. 
Legal scholars and political science authors are divided regarding the use of  these and similar tools, some 
consider that their excessive use halts progress and does not respect the will of  the majority. Others 
counterargue that these tools are essential in protection the rights of  the minority. These positions are 
sometimes inconsistent and tend to vary in accordance with the political party who is in power. Regarding 
filibusters see, Gregory Koger, Filibustering: A Political History of  Obstruction in the House and Senate (Chicago: 
The University of  Chicago Press, 2010); Catherine Fisk and Erwin Chemerinsk, “The Filibuster”, Stanford 
Law Review vol. 49, No. 2 (1997): 181-254; David R. Jones, “Explaining restraint from filibustering in 
the US senate”, The Journal of  Legislative Studies, vol. 6, No. 4 (2000): 53-68; Patrick Fisher, “The filibuster 
and the nature of  representation in the United States Senate”, Parliaments, Estates and Representation, vol. 
26, No. 1 (2006): 187-195; Martin B. Gold and Dimple Gupta, “The Constitutional Option to Change 
Senate Rules and Procedures: A Majoritarian Means to Overcome The Filibuster”, Harvard Journal of  
Law and Public Policy, vol. 28, No. 1 (2005): 205-272; Michael J. Gerhardt, “The Constitutionality of  the 
Filibuster”, Constitutional Commentary, 21 (2005): 445-484; Ernest Bormann, “The southern senators’ 
filibuster on civil rights: Speechmaking as parliamentary stratagem”, The Southern Speech Journal, vol. 27, 
No. 3 (1962): 183-194; Steven S. Smith and Hong Min Park, “Americans’ Attitudes About the Senate 
Filibuster”, American Politics Research, vol. 41, No. 5 (2013): 735-760; Sarah A. Binder, Eric D. Lawrence 
and Steven S. Smith, “Tracking the Filibuster, 1917 to 1996”, American Politics Research, vol. 30, No. 4 
(2002): 406-422; Josh Chafet, “The Unconstitutionality of  the Filibuster”, Connecticut Law Review, vol. 
43, No. 4 (2011): 1003-1040; Gerard N. Magliocca, “Reforming the Filibuster”, Northwestern University 
Law Review, vol. 105, No. 1 (2011): 303-328; Emmet J. Bondurant, “The Senate Filibuster: The Politics 
Of  Obstruction”, Harvard Journal on Legislation, vol. 48, No. 2 (2011): 467-514; Laura T. Gorjanc, “The 
Solution to the Filibuster Problem: Putting the Advice Back in Advice and Consent”, Case Western Reserve 
Law Review, vol. 54, No. 4 (2004): 1435-1463; Brent Wible, “Filibuster vs. Supermajority Rule: From 
Polarization to a Consensus- and Moderation – Forcing Mechanism for Judicial Confirmations”, William 
& Mary Bill of  Rights Journal, vol. 13, No. 3 (2005): 923-965. Regarding shutdowns, their motives and 
effects see, Clinton T. Brass, Shutdown of  the Federal Government: Causes, Processes, and Effects (Washington, 
DC: Congressional Research Service, 2013), http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=2182&context=key_workplace; Kevin R. Kosar,  “Shutdown of  the Federal Government: 
Causes, Effects, and Process” CRS Report for Congress (2004), https://archives-democrats-rules.
house.gov/archives/98-844.pdf; Roy T. Meyers, “Late Appropriations and Government Shutdowns: 
Frequency, Causes, Consequences, and Remedies”, Public Budgeting & Finance, vol. 17, No. 3 (1997): 
25-38; Scott R. Baker and Constantine Yannelis, “Income Changes and Consumption: Evidence from 
the 2013 Federal Government Shutdown”, Review of  Economic Dynamics, vol. 23 (2017): 99-124; Corinne 
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Some notable examples of  the use of  the consultation procedure are:
	Article 21(3) TFEU, allowing Council – absent (specific) provision of  the 
necessary powers by the Treaties – to adopt measures concerning social security 
or social protection to protect the right of  Union citizens to move and reside 
freely within the territories of  the Member States. 
	Article 74 TFEU, regarding the adoption of  measures to ensure administrative 
cooperation between Member States within the Union’s area of  freedom, 
security and justice.52
	Articles 150 and 160 TFEU, regarding the establishment of  the Employment 
Committee and the Social Protection Committee.
	Article 218(6) TFEU, when the consent procedure is not necessary. 
	Article 311 (3rd paragraph) TFUE, regarding the adoption of  provisions relating 
to the system of  owning resources of  the Union. The Council’s decision will 
not enter into force until it is approved by the Member States in accordance 
with their respective constitutional requirements.
4. Exceptions 
There are cases when the Council can adopt legislation without involving 
the EP or the Commission at all. These situations are highly uncommon in nature 
and can be seen as a remnant of  Council “supremacy” which was manifest in the 
EU’s past. It is relevant to highlight Article 108(2) TFEU according to which“on 
application by a Member State, the Council may, acting unanimously, decide that aid which that 
State is granting or intends to grant shall be considered to be compatible with the internal market, in 
derogation from the provisions of  Article 107 or from the regulations provided for in Article 109, 
if  such a decision is justified by exceptional circumstances”. On occasion, the Commission 
may also exercise independent legislative power in accordance with Articles 45(3)(d), 
and 106(3) TFEU. However, the Commission’s use of  this power has been rare53. 
The Commission may also be called upon to adopt Delegated or Implementing 
Acts (290 and 291 TFUE).54 Implementing Acts do “no more than ensure the uniform 
Bendersky, “Resolving ideological conflicts by affirming opponents’ status: The Tea Party, Obamacare 
and the 2013 government shutdown”, Journal of  Experimental Social Psychology, vol. 53 (2014): 163-
168; David R. Jones, “Party Brands, Elections, and Presidential-Congressional Relations”, accessed 
December 11, 2018, https://www.baruch.cuny.edu/wsas/academics/political_science/documents/
PartyBrandsElectionsandPresidentialCongressionalRelations.pdf; Debbie Rabina and Anthony 
Cocciolo, “US Government Websites During the 2013 Shutdown: Lessons from the Shutdown Library”, 
Alexandria: The Journal of  National and International Library and Information, vol. 25, issue 1-2 (2014): 21-
30; David Scott Louk and David Gamage, “Preventing Government Shutdowns: Designing Default 
Rules for Budgets”, University of  Colorado Law Review, vol. 86 (2015): 181-258; Katharine G. Young, 
“American Exceptionalism and Government Shutdowns: A Comparative Constitutional Reflection on 
the 2013 Lapse in Appropriations”, Boston University Law Review, vol. 94, No. 3 (2014): 991-1027; Ricard 
Gil and Mario Macis, “Ain’t No Rest for the Wicked”: Population, Crime, and the 2013 Government 
Shutdown”, Discussion Paper No. 8864 (Bonn: IZA, 2015), http://repec.iza.org/dp8864.pdf; Chris C. 
Martin and Kimmo Eriksson, “Who Accurately Predicted the End of  the Government Shutdown?”, 
accessed December 11, 2018, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2609920.
52 Regarding this point and as abovementioned, in addition the Commission, Member States may also 
have the right to initiate legislation in accordance with Article 76 (TFEU). 
53 Alina Kaczorowska, European, 160; Lorna Woods and Philippa Watson, EU Law (11th ed., Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), 171.  
54 Ana Maria Guerra Martins, “Anotação ao artigo 48.º do TUE”, in Tratado de Lisboa, 176-182; 
Eileen Denza, “Article 48 [Treaty Revision Procedures]”, in The Treaty on European Union, 1331-1355; 
Luis Jimena Quesada, “The Revision Procedures of  the Treaty”, in The European Union after Lisbon: 
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implementation of  the legally binding acts from which they get their legal basis. Unlike delegated 
acts, implementing acts cannot amend or supplement even non-essential elements of  the original act. 
Therefore, implementing acts are well suited to regulate highly technical matters where there is a 
need for very specific rules to ensure harmonized implementation and application through the EU”. 
Both types of  acts must be expressly provided for in the original Act. Delegated 
Acts may be revoked by Parliament or Council and may only enter into force absent 
objections from these Institutions. Meanwhile, Implementing Acts55 are subject to 
Comitology, which gives Member States the power to examine the Act (and even 
block it when under the examination procedure) and the European Parliament and 
Council the power to scrutinize it, albeit absent the blocking and revoking powers 
that they enjoy in Delegated Acts.56/57/58/59
5. Passerelle Clauses 
A brief  reference to the passerelle clauses contained within the Treaties. Passerelle 
clauses may be used to simplify or to replace the special legislative procedure originally 
enshrined in the Treaties with the ordinary legislative procedure. Article 48(7) of  the 
TEU contains a general passerelle clause setting forth that:
a) “Where the Treaty on the Functioning of  the European Union or Title V of  this Treaty 
provides for the Council to act by unanimity in a given area or case, the European Council 
may adopt a decision authorising the Council to act by a qualified majority in that area or in 
that case. This subparagraph shall not apply to decisions with military implications or those 
in the area of  defence”; and 
b) “Where the Treaty on the Functioning of  the European Union provides for legislative acts 
to be adopted by the Council in accordance with a special legislative procedure, the European 
Council may adopt a decision allowing for the adoption of  such acts in accordance with the 
ordinary legislative procedure.”
In both cases, National Parliaments must be notified and can exercise veto 
power within six months of  the notification date.60
Constitutional Basis, Economic Order and External Action, eds. Hermann-Josef  Blanke and Stelio Mangiameli 
(Heidelberg: Springer, 2012), 323-342; Miguel Gorjão-Henriques, Direito da União: História,  291.
55 One should note that, strictly speaking, Implementing Acts should be categorized as administrative 
acts and not as legislative acts. 
56 See, Michael Kaeding and Kevin M. Stack, “Legislative Scrutiny? The Political Economy and Practice 
of  Legislative Vetoes in the European Union”, Journal of  Common Market Studies, vol. 53, No. 6 (2015): 
1268-1284; Michael Kaeding e Kevin M. Stack, “A dearth of  legislative vetoes: Why the Council and 
Parliament have been reluctant to veto Commission legislation”, LSE Blog, accessed December 20, 
2019, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2016/10/25/a-dearth-of-legislative-vetoes/. 
57 Exceptionally, in accordance with Articles 24 and 26 TFEU, the Council may adopt implementing 
acts (Article 291(2) TFEU), 
58 See, Marília Frias and Tiago Sérgio Cabral,“New Regulation on the rules and procedures for the 
operation of  unmanned aircraft: Part A – Its relationship with national laws”, Vda, accessed August 20, 
2019, https://www.vda.pt/pt/publicacoes/insights/new-regulation-on-the-rules-and-procedures-for-
the-operation-of-unmanned-aircraft-part-a-its/21300/. 
59 Under Regulation 182/2011/EU of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  16 February 
2011 laying down the rules and general principles concerning mechanisms for control by Member 
States of  the Commission’s exercise of  implementing powers.
60 See, António Gameiro, O papel dos Parlamentos nacionais na União Europeia (Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, 
2011), 411; Alessandra Silveira, “Sull’esercizio delle competenze dell’Unione europea: il Parlamento 
portoghese e il giudizio di conformità al principio di sussidiarietà”, in The role of  national parliaments in 
the EU integration process (Wolters Kluwer Italia/CEDAM: Milan, 2016); Rudolf  Hrbek, “The Role of  
National Parliaments in the EU”, in The European Union after Lisbon, 129-157. 
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Additionally, there are special passerelle clauses applicable only to specific 
matters, but whose requirements are generally easier to meet than the ones for the 
general clause. These clauses may be found in Articles 31(3) TUE, 81(3) TFUE, 
153(2) TFUE, 192(2) TFUE, 312(2) TFUE and 333(1 and 2) TFUE.
There are distinct advantages in using passerelle clauses to replace the use of  
special legislative procedures by the ordinary legislative procedure. Even though one 
can express some concerns regarding the transparency and democratic legitimacy of  
the ordinary legislative procedure when taking into account trilogues, any issue pales 
in comparison to the ones suffered by the special procedures. The expansion of  the 
ordinary legislative procedure under the Treaty of  Lisbon was a sensible and wise 
decision and a simplified manner to build upon it should be welcomed. However, 
this is not to say that passerelle clauses are flawless. This legislative tool grants too 
much power to the ECON in the legislative procedure, where there is no apparent 
reason for it to have any61. The power to trigger a passerelle clause should rest with the 
European Parliament itself, which is the interested party and the Institution with the 
highest connection with the European Citizens and the highest degree of  democratic 
legitimacy. To keep State control over the procedure, the Council could be called 
upon to approve or reject the triggering of  the clause. Veto power by National 
Parliaments offers a robust second layer of  State control, making the systematically 
incoherent intervention of  the ECON unneeded. 
6. Citizens’ Initiative
Citizens can directly propose legislation at the European level, in accordance 
with the principles enshrined within Article 11(4) TEU and 24 TFEU. Regulation 
No. 2019/788 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 Abril 2019 on 
the citizens’ initiative operationalises and develops the Constitutional principles. 
Using this tool entails fulfilling some strict requirements regarding 
representativity. The organisers must come from seven or more Member States 
and subscribers from, at least, ¼ of the Member States (Article 5(1)). The 
minimum number of signatures is 1 million with distribution rules. Besides the 
abovementioned rules, organisers have to ensure that signatures, also, correspond, 
at least “to the number of the Members of the European Parliament elected in each Member 
State, multiplied by the total number of Members [of the EP]” (Article 3(1)). 
The Commission has the power to stop initiatives at an early stage by refusing 
their registration. However, this power should only be used when: i) the initiative 
manifestly falls outside the framework of  the Commission’s powers to submit a 
proposal for a legal Act of  the Union for the purpose of  implementing the Treaties; 
61 The reason is probably due to the fact that using a passerelle clause effectively changes the basic rules 
of  European Constitution law as enshrined in the Treaties and, in accordance to the underlying logic, 
this should be left to heads of  State in the European Council. But that logic is incredibly flawed. First, 
opinions in the Council and European Council will be the mirror image of  each other more frequently 
than not, so needing the European Council to trigger the clause and the Council to approve the (future) 
legislation is not logical. If  we have to choose between the two institutions, the Council, which actually 
was law-making powers would be the most adequate. Second, those heads of  State will frequently 
not have any law-making, let alone constitutionally amending powers on their States, it does not seem 
coherent for them to have it at a European level. Furthermore, they lack the mandate or democratic 
legitimacy for it. The fact the European Council is not needed is even clearer when national parliaments 
(which tend to have a higher degree of  legitimacy) are involved and have veto power, therefore being 
perfectly able to raise any issues that a Member State might have with the amendment. 
® UNIO - EU LAW JOURNAL Vol. 6, No. 1,  January 2020
179 Tiago Sérgio Cabral
ii) the initiative is manifestly abusive, frivolous or vexatious; or iii) the proposed
citizens’ initiative is manifestly contrary to the values of  the Union as set out in 
Article 2 TEU62. 
Displaying a high degree of attention to the issue of democratic participation, 
the legislator opted to guarantee the existence of various possible tools to collect 
support for the initiatives (including paper and electronically). Collection should 
follow the rules of Articles 8 - 11 of the Regulation. 
If success is achieved by the organisers and the initiative meets its goal, the 
Commission must publish it in the register with celerity and “receive the group of 
organisers at an appropriate level to allow them to explain in detail the objectives”. 
Furthermore, the Commission, within six months, has to “set out in a communication 
its legal and political conclusions on the initiative, the action it intends to take, if any, and its 
reasons for taking or not taking that action” (Article 15). 
Additionally, a public audience must be organised in the European Parliament, 
within three months of the submission, where organisers have the opportunity to 
explain and argue for their proposal. In addition to the European Parliament and 
Commission, it is open to the participation of civil society and other institutions, 
bodies or national parliaments that show interest63. 
7. Concluding thoughts
 Due to the necessary balance of  interests within the EU, its legislative procedure 
is quite complex, though not necessarily more complex, or less transparent than the 
respective national procedures of  its Member States. Still, this does not mean that 
there is no room for improvement. 
Establishing a right of  initiative for the European Parliament only appears 
more urgent as time goes on. By design, the European Parliament will have superior 
European legitimacy when compared to the other Institution. However, present 
times bring specific challenges and a range of  doubts may be raised regarding the 
legitimacy of  the EC (particularly its President) due to not having been elected under 
the spitzenkandidaten process. Parliament could be in prime position now to propose 
certain solutions that the present (and one could argue weakened from a legitimacy 
standpoint) Commission might struggle to. 
Whenever it is feasible, the ordinary legislative procedure should be used 
instead of  the special procedures. This may mean making use of  passerelle clauses 
to the special legislative procedure originally enshrined in the Treaties with the 
ordinary legislative procedure. The objective is both to achieve more legitimacy and 
accountability. Still, this effort may be rendered moot if  it is not accompanied by 
reinforcing transparency in the Ordinary Legislative Procedure itself. Specifically for 
trilogues which are a key (but seldom studied) part of  the EU’s legislative procedure, 
62 The General Court was called upon to intervene in two occasions when the Commission refused 
citizen’s initiatives in an unlawful manner. See, Pedro Infante Mota, “Acordos Mega-Regionais”, in União 
Europeia – Reforma ou Declínio, coord. Eduardo Paz Ferreira (Lisboa: Vega, 2016), 376-399; Judgment of  
EGC of  3 February 2017, Minority SafePack - one million signatures for diversity in Europe, Case T-646/13, 
ECLI:EU:T:2017:59;  Judgment of  the EGC of  10 May 2017,  Stop TTIP (Efler v. Commission), Case 
T-754/14, ECLI:EU:T:2017:323; Judgment of  the EGC of  24 September 2019, Romania v. Commission, 
Case T-391/17, ECLI:EU:T:2019:672. 
63 Patrícia Calvão Teles, “Anotação ao artigo 24.º do TFUE”, in Tratado de Lisboa Anotado e Comentado, 
coords. Manuel Lopes Porto and Gonçalo Anastácio (Coimbra: Almedina, 2012), 264-267; Dulce Lopes 
and Paula Veiga, “Anotação ao artigo 11.º do TUE”, in Tratado de Lisboa Anotado e Comentado, 54-57.
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transparency should be reinforced and we would go as far as to state that the general 
rule should be for open access to documents related to them, with exceptions only 
tolerable when disclosure of  the document would seriously undermine the institution’s 
decision-making process. In fact, exceptions should be interpreted restrictively in 
what appears to be in line with the General Court’s interpretation who rejected the 
“infantilization” of  the European citizen as someone who could not understand the 
needed negotiations at the EU level. Allowing further access to citizens or, at least, 
interested stakeholders may also contribute to foster accountability. Lastly, it is not 
infrequent to see EU Law Manuals and EU Law syllabus at a University level which 
ignore trilogues completely. Taking into account the statistics we shared above, this 
does not seem reasonable, therefore more study into trilogues is needed to shine 
some light into the procedure. 
